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SPEECH REGULATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA: VOID FOR VAGUENESS OR
OVERBREADTH?
I. INTRODUCTION
As children we were taught that, "sticks and stones may break
my bones but words will never hurt me."' However, in response to
an upsurge of racism on college campuses nationwide, universities
have enacted various forms of anti-harassment policies to suppress
racial antagonism.' In particular, the University of California
adopted a policy applicable to all nine University of California cam-
puses designed to combat harassment.' The University of California
Harassment Policy (UC Harassment Policy) in subsection 51.xx
prohibits:
The use of "fighting words" by students to harass any person(s)
on University property, on other property to which these poli-
cies apply as defined in campus implementing regulations, or in
connection with official University functions or University-spon-
sored programs.
"Fighting words" are those personally abusive epithets which,
when directly addressed to any ordinary person are, in the con-
text used and as a matter of common knowledge, inherently
1. Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11-
12 (1990) (explaining the falsity of this children's rhyme in the context of sexist speech in the
workplace); see also Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143 (1982) (illustrating that
mere words can cause mental, emotional, and even physical harm).
2. A number of universities have adopted or are considering restrictions on slurs directed
at individuals based on their sex, sexual orientation, race, disabilities, ethnicity, or religion.
These include: University of California, Stanford University, The University of Michigan,
University of Connecticut, Emory University, Brown University, Tufts University, Pennsylva-
nia State University, University of Texas at Austin, Arizona State University, University of
Pennsylvania, and University of Wisconsin. Robin Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies
Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues. CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al,
A38; see also Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 431-33 (citing examples of racial incidents on college campuses
nationwide); Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Chilly Climate on College Campuses:
An Expansion of the "Hate Speech" Debate, 1990 DUKE L.J. 574, 575-76 (citing examples of
subtle discriminatory behaviors that are not covered under current campus harassment
regulations).
3. Jonathan Shapiro, UC's Doctrine of Silence, RECORDER, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1.
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likely to provoke a violent reaction whether or not they actually
do so. Such words include, but are not limited to, those terms
widely recognized to be derogatory references to race, ethnicity,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other personal
characteristics. "Fighting words" constitute "harassment" when
the circumstances of their utterance create a hostile and intimi-
dating environment which the student uttering them should rea-
sonably know will interfere with the victim's ability to pursue
effectively his or her education or otherwise to participate fully
in University programs and activities.4
Public school regulations are subject to constitutional scrutiny.'
Thus, the UC Harassment Policy could be challenged under consti-
tutional doctrines which protect freedom of expression.6
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 7 pro-
hibits governmental action restraining free speech. However, in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire' the United States Supreme Court
held that language constituting "fighting words .. .which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace" does not warrant constitutional protection.
There are two distinct viewpoints as to whether free speech on
college campuses should be regulated in order to curb an upsurge of
4. UNIVERSITY OF CAL. UNIVERSITYWIDE STUDENT CONDUCT: HARASSMENT POLICY
§ 51.xx (Sept. 21, 1989) (implementing addition to UNIVERSITY OF CAL., POLICIES APPLYING
1TO CAMPUS ACTIVITIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STUDENTS (PART A) (1983) [hereinafter UC
Harassment Policy].
5. The United States Supreme Court stated that students do not "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate" in Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Although the Court stated
that particular expressive activities could not be prohibited because of a "mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint," the Court
held that there was no absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school or its environs
for unlimited expressive purposes. Id. at 509; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986) and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
For a general discussion of First Amendment implications in educational institutions, see
Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Institutions: A Proposed Pol-
icy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 360-63 (1991).
6. This comment will focus on the two closely related doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness. See infra part II.B-C; see also Edward M. Chen, Preface to Jens B.Koepke, The
University of California Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heart in Ill-fitting Garb, 12 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593 (1990). "The critical constitutional question is not whether there is
sufficient justification for rules prohibiting harassment, but whether any proposed regulation is
narrowly drawn and sufficiently clear so as to avoid the First Amendment problems of over-
breadth and vagueness." Id. at 597.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging
the freedom of speech").
8. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. Id. at 572.
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racial intolerance. They highlight the tension between the promotion
of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment'0
and the right of free speech." One view advocates that campus ra-
cism results in minorities being treated as second-class students.'"
University administrators must therefore regulate hate speech be-
cause it will ensure equal educational opportunities to minority stu-
dents by not subjecting them to racial assaults.'" Furthermore, hate
speech can be regulated because it falls under the "fighting words"
exception to First Amendment protection. 4
The opposing arguments focus on the inherent difficulty of ef-
fective speech regulation without violation of the fundamental First
Amendment freedom of speech guarantee." For example, speech re-
strictions have traditionally been overturned as content-based restric-
tions that are constitutionally prohibited." The basic premise of this
view is that more speech, rather than less speech, will promote
equality. 7 One federal court has already decided that a campus pol-
icy regulating hate speech was vague and overbroad in Doe v. Uni-
versity of Michigan.8
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing that "[nlo State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
11. But see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-
sal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 489 (claiming this is a false dichotomy and that the goals are
instead mutually reinforcing).
12. See generally, Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2370-73 (1989) (discussing the resultant inequality
created by racist remarks among university students); Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race
Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295, 323-27 (1990) (noting the effects of racism
and disparaging remarks to historically disadvantaged groups in the university setting).
13. Ira Eisenberg, Fighting Words: Race and Free Speech at the University of Califor-
nia, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 9, 1990, This World, at 8.
14. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 451.
15. It is not possible to formulate a restriction against racist speech that is narrow
enough not to "catch[] in the same net all kinds of speech that ... would be unconscionable for
a democratic society to suppress." Charles Lawrence & Gerald Gunther, Is There Ever a
Good Reason to Restrict Free Speech on a College Campus?, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept.
9, 1990, This World, at 10, 15.
16. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Tlhe First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter or its content."); see also, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 1164-66 (11th ed. 1985).
17. See Strossen supra note 11, at 560 (noting the positive outcome of allowing rather
than prohibiting speech). "If these expressions had been chilled by virtue of university sanc-
tions, then it is doubtful that there would be such widespread discussion on campuses, let alone
generally, about the real problem of racism." Id. (footnote omitted).
18. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see discussion infra part II.D. A federal
district court recently found another university speech restriction unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991).
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This comment discusses the constitutional doctrines of "fighting
words," overbreadth, and vagueness. 9 The comment then applies
the tests for "fighting words," overbreadth, and vagueness to the UC
Harassment Policy.20 Finally, the comment proposes an amendment
to the UC Harassment Policy to protect students from personal har-
assment while mitigating the effects of censorship."
II. BACKGROUND
The UC Harassment Policy is patterned after the speech-limit-
ing "fighting words" doctrine. It is thus important to first under-
stand the doctrine's rationale and current judicial treatment before
testing the UC Harassment Policy for constitutional soundness.
A. "Fighting Words" Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court explained that language con-
stituting "fighting words .. .which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" is not
protected by the First Amendment.22 Epithets or personal abuse are
not considered communication safeguarded by the Constitution and
are therefore subject to sanctions. 2 The theory of the regulation of
" 'fighting words' is not contrary to the theory of the free market-
place of ideas because this speech triggers an automatic, unthinking
reaction, rather than a consideration of an idea." '24
The doctrine evolved in Chaplinsky when the Court upheld a
breach of the peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for calling the
City Marshal "'a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fas-
cist.'"25 The conviction was based on a violation of a state statute
which stated that no person "shall address any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or
other public place."26 The Court's rationale was that the slight social
value of "fighting words" as a step toward truth is outweighed by
19. See discussion infra part I.A-C.
20. See discussion infra part IV.A-C.
21. See discussion infra part V.A-C.
22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
23. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) ("Resort to epithets or per-
sonal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument.").
24. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.37 (1986).
25. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70.
26. Id. at 569.
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the social interest in order and morality.2 It should be noted that
Chaplinsky was not convicted for his distribution of religious litera-
ture or the potential for public disturbance, but for his criticisms
made directly to the City Marshal. 8
The Chaplinsky "fighting words" doctrine includes the follow-
ing elements: First, the speech is only unprotected in a face-to-face,
verbal encounter where it invites reprisal at the time of the state-
ment." Next, the language must be inherently likely to produce a
violent reaction.3" Finally, the words must be likely to provoke retal-
iation by the average addressee; the doctrine does not require an ac-
tual violent response.8 1 "The test is what men of common intelli-
gence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight." '32
As originally developed, the "fighting words" doctrine focused
on the content of the language rather than the context in which it
was uttered. 3 Recent Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated,
however, that the factual circumstances of the communication will be
examined in addition to the content of the words themselves."' These
cases uphold the "fighting words" doctrine, but also indicate that any
"fighting words" convictions will be carefully scrutinized.38 Cohen v.
California6 emphasized that the exception will be narrowly con-
27. Id. at 572.
28. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.38 (1986).
29. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. A "fighting words" statute is invalid on its face if it is
not limited to words which have a direct tendency to inflict injury or to incite an immediate
breach of the peace by the person to whom the remark is addressed. City of Houston v. Hill,
482 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1987) (citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133
(1974)).
30. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
31. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 28, at § 16.38; see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 523 (1972) (emphasizing that Chaplinsky was based on a state statute that only prohib-
ited words which had a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence") (quoting Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 573).
32. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
33. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-10, at 850 (2d
ed. 1988); see also Strossen supra, note 11, at 509 ("ITihe Court has invalidated regulations
that hold certain words to be per se proscribable and insisted that each challenged utterance be
evaluated contextually.").
34. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974) (explaining that witness using
the word "chickenshit" in court did not pose imminent threat); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973) (holding that expletive stated during antiwar demonstration not sufficient for convic-
tion); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (holding that statements made during flag-
burning did not qualify as "fighting words").
35. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 24, § 20.40, at 198.
36. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning a conviction for breach of the peace based on the
defendant's presence in a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket lettered with "Fuck the
Draft" on the back).
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strued since offensive language must be directly addressed to the lis-
tener and provoke a hostile reaction." As a result, the distinction
between "fighting words" and offensive language is unclear. Offen-
sive language, unlike "fighting words," is protected speech. 8
The "fighting words" doctrine was reaffirmed in a more recent
Supreme Court case, Gooding v. Wilson. 9 The Court stated, "Our
decisions since Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state power
constitutionally to punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn
statutes not also susceptible of application to protected expression."'"
The Gooding Court struck down a Georgia statute which provided
that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of an-
other, and in his presence . . .opprobrious words or abusive lan-
guage, tending to cause a breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."' 1 Although the Court defined "opprobrious" and
"abusive" as "conveying . . .disgrace," and "harsh insulting lan-
guage,'"'4 respectively, the Court held that "these were not words
'which by their very utterance . . . tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace,' ,,4' those denominated "fighting words." The
Court thus has construed "fighting words" restrictions to apply only
in circumstances that lead to immediate violence."
Rather than address the "fighting words" issue, the Court has
often used the overbreadth"' and vagueness' 6 doctrines to invalidate
statutes on their face.' Thus, it is important to understand the over-
breadth and vagueness doctrines since a "fighting words" speech reg-
ulation must also pass these two tests to be constitutionally valid.
B. Overbreadth Doctrine
Overbreadth embodies the principle that "a governmental pur-
pose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 22-26 ("[Plublic expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
39. 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 519.
42. Id. at 525 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)).
43. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
44. See TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-18, at 929 & n.9.
45. See discussion infra part II.B.
46. See discussion infra part II.C.
47. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 28, § 16.40, at 946.
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broadly and thereby invade the area of [constitutionally] protected
freedoms."'48 Therefore, a law is overbroad if it regulates "a substan-
tial amount of constitutionally protected"4" expression as well as
speech or conduct not constitutionally protected. The overbreadth
doctrine provides an exception for standing, along with potential in-
validation of statutes on their "face" or "as applied." '
The overbreadth doctrine allows an exception to the ordinary
standing requirement for constitutional adjudication.51 For a justicia-
ble constitutional claim, Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion"2 requires that a person assert a direct and immediate personal
injury 3 and that the injury suffered be caused by the challenged
violation.54 In an overbreadth analysis, the court allows a challenger
to assert rights of third parties not before the court."0 "A litigant
whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a
statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amend-
ment rights of other parties not before the court.""
The injured party standing requirement is overlooked particu-
larly in First Amendment contexts because of the potential deterrent
effect on third party protected speech and association activities.5"
This third party standing exception has been justified by the Court
because of the concern that third parties may refrain from engaging
in constitutionally protected speech for fear of criminal sanctions by
statutes potentially applicable to protected expression." The Court
will find a statute overbroad in order to remove the deterrent effect
48. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
49. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494
(1982).
50. See GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 1148; TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-27, at 1023.
51. But see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1981). Professor
Monaghan argues that the overbreadth doctrine "does not in fact possess a distinctive standing
component; it is rather the application of conventional standing concepts in the First Amend-
ment context." Id. at 3.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (providing judicial power to decide "cases or contro-
versies"). For a discussion of the general rules of standing, see Russell Galloway, Basic Jus-
ticiability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 911, 921-29 (1990).
53. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
55. See GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 1148-49. But see Monaghan, supra note 51, at 39
("Overbreadth analysis is concerned with the substance of constitutional review; it does not
rely on any distinctive standing component."). Professor Monaghan argues that overbreadth
challenges involve first, not third party standing. Id. at 14-23.
56. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
57. Id. at 620.
58. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1971).
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on speech.' 9 The resultant effect is that a statute must be narrowly
drawn so as to punish only unprotected expression and have no sus-
ceptibility to protected speech. a
A statute may be found overbroad "on its face" or "as applied"
to a particular litigant."' Invalidation of a statute on its face is
"strong medicine."'1 2 This is because a statute overbroad on its face is
invalidated not because of a litigant's particular situation, but be-
cause the statute "might be applied to others not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected.""3 As a result, an en-
tire statute may be struck down before the statute is applied to the
challenger." ' Therefore, the statute may be invalid if it prohibits
privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the
litigant has engaged in such privileged conduct." Usually, in consti-
tutional adjudication, statutes found unconstitutional are invalidated
only as applied to the individual litigant.00 However, the overbreadth
methodology invalidates the entire statute "on its face."
A specific example of an overbroad statute that proscribed pro-
tected speech is found in Lewis v. City of New Orleans.67 A city
ordinance made it unlawful "to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference" to a police officer
performing his duties." The ordinance punished all vulgar and of-
fensive language. 9 However, some of this type of language is consti-
tutionally protected because all vulgar and offensive language does
not necessarily constitute "fighting words." 7 Therefore, the Court
held that the ordinance was constitutionally overbroad and facially
invalid because it was "susceptible of application to protected
59. Id.
60. Id. at 522.
61. See sources cited supra note 50.
62. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) ("Facial overbreadth has not
been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute.").
63. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 1149.
64. Id.; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
65. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
66. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423,
423-24 (1974).
67. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
68. Id. at 132.
69. Id. at 133. The Court stated that the dictionary definition of "opprobrious" included
words " 'conveying or intended to convey disgrace' and therefore that the term was not limited
to words which 'by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.' " Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972)).
70. Id. at 134.
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speech. 17 1 Since the ordinance was facially invalidated, it was irrele-
vant that the litigant's words could have been unprotected under a
more narrowly drawn statute that did not reach protected speech."
Laws which courts find void on their face for overbreadth have
two primary characteristics: First, the laws prohibit both constitu-
tionally protected and unprotected activity; second, the law may not
be rehabilitated to reach only unprotected activity.73 Facial invalida-
tion, rather than a gradual narrowing of the laws on a case-by-case
basis, is seen as the only remedy in these cases because of the "pecu-
liarly vulnerable characteristics of activities protected by the First
Amendment." 4 Laws proscribing speech will be tested only by those
willing to risk criminal prosecution or other sanctions to determine
the scope of the regulation." If the court reaches the "as applied"
analysis, the court will consider whether the challenger's particular
situation could be reached by a more narrowly drawn law.7 If the
court finds the challenger's speech is protected, the law is, as a re-
sult, narrowed. In an overbreadth analysis, therefore, a litigant may
challenge a law both as it applies to him or on its face.
In sum, the overbreadth doctrine encompasses a two part analy-
sis. The court will first question whether the legislative means are as
narrowly drawn as possible to achieve the governmental purpose as
it is applied to the challenger before the court.77 Second, the court
will question whether application of the statute will violate the con-
stitutional rights of third parties not before the court, regardless of
whether the specific litigant's rights are protected.78 If so, the statute
will be invalidated on its face.
C. Vagueness Doctrine
While the vagueness doctrine parallels the overbreadth doc-
trine, 79 it is distinct. "A law that does not reach constitutionally pro-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 133.
73. See TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-27, at 1022.
74. See TRIBE supra note 33, § 12-27, at 1023.
75. See TRIBE, supra note 33, § 10-27, at 1022.(quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 487 (1965)).
76. See GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 1149.
77. Monaghan, supra, note 51, at 3. But see GUNTHER, supra note 16, § 12-1, at 1149
n.5 ("Should the Justices be under an obligation to explain what narrower means are available
to achieve the state's objective?").
78. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 1149.
79. The overbreadth doctrine strikes laws which prohibit constitutionally protected con-
duct along with conduct which may be forbidden. See discussion supra part Jl.B. The vague-
1992] 1267
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tected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may never-
theless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due
process." 80 Vagueness analysis focuses on the clarity of the law.8'
First, the challenged law must provide adequate notice of the
type of conduct prohibited.82 To satisfy procedural due process, the
notice must provide a "sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct when measured by common understanding and prac-
tices." 88 A law is void for vagueness on its face if persons "of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application." '84 The court evaluates both the words and prior
judicial constructions of the statute.8 '
For example, in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc.," the Court upheld a local ordinance requiring
licensing for the sale of products "designed or marketed for use"
with illegal drugs because a "business person of ordinary intelligence
would understand" the terms and their application.87 A business
person would understand that "designed for use" refers to the design
of the manufacturer and that "marketed for use" refers to a retailer's
merchandise display.88
The notice element has evolved into strict judicial scrutiny espe-
cially when it relates to fundamental constitutional rights such as
freedom of speech.89 A vague law proscribing speech has a chilling
effect that deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected
speech. On the other hand, an unclear zoning statute may deter
ness doctrine strikes laws which are unclear. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982). The constitutional basis for vagueness is found in the notice requirement of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3; see, e.g., Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927). Yet, the vagueness doctrine is applied in the First
Amendment arena because a vague statute has the same chilling effect on protected speech as
an overbroad statute. See TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-31, at 1034.
81. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic principle of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined.").
82. Id.
83. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
84. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-14; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926).
85. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110-111.
86. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
87. Id. at 500-01.
88. Id. at 501-02.
89. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597-604
(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
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property use, but does not rise to the same caliber of constitutional
significance. 90 The Court has been more tolerant of statutes with
civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of
vagueness are less severe; nevertheless, civil statutes are subject to the
vagueness test.'" Finally, inclusion of a scienter requirement may
mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to notice.
92
Second, the court scrutinizes the law for potential arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.'" This scrutiny recently evolved into an
independent factor.' 4 An application of this factor is illustrated in
Smith v. Goguen." Goguen was convicted of violating a statute
prohibiting "contemptuous" conduct against the United States flag
by wearing a flag on the seat of his pants." The Court reversed his
conviction on the grounds that the statute was void for vagueness.' 7
Although the statute did not provide adequate notice, the Court em-
phasized that police, prosecutors, and juries would determine and
enforce which acts were violations based on personal preferences."
Prohibition of discriminatory enforcement was later formally
recognized as the primary goal of the vagueness doctrine in Kolender
v. Lawson." In Kolender, the Court overturned a statute that al-
lowed police to stop people loitering on the street and require identi-
fication.1"' The Court was concerned that police could arbitrarily en-
force the statute and stop individuals without cause.' 0 ' This was
especially disconcerting to the Court because of the potential for ar-
bitrary suppression of First Amendment freedoms for individuals." 2
90. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 28, § 16.9, at 846.
91. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99 (upholding statute which did not
deter lawful speech). When there is a danger the law will "chill" constitutionally protected
speech, the Court applies a more stringent vagueness test. Id. at 499.
92. Id. The scienter requirement ensures adequacy of notice of the proscribed conduct.
Id. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) (striking down a criminal statute
without an intent requirement because it was a "trap for those who act in good faith").
93. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
94. Id. at 109.
95. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
96. Id. at 570.
97. Id. at 582. The statute provided, in relevant part: "Whoever publicly mutilates,
tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States . . . shall be
punished." Id. at 568-69. The "treats contemptuously" language was held void for vagueness
because it failed "to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment
that are criminal and those that are not." Id. at 574.
98. Id. at 575.
99. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
100. Id. at 361.
101. Id. at 358.
102. Id.
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A vague statute may be saved if it can be construed to provide
definitions that are at least as clear as those used in common law.103
Alternatively, a vague statute may be saved if the statute can be lim-
ited.' 04 This is especially true when statutes are limited to "catego-
ries" of speech that are unprotected.' 5 However, when a statute's
scope has not been narrowed by any state court interpretation and
reaches expression protected by the First Amendment, the vagueness
doctrine demands much greater precision than in other contexts.' 0 6
In the First Amendment arena, the vagueness doctrine prohibits stat-
utes that restrain speech in vague terms that would include protected
forms of speech or make it unclear as to when speech would violate
the statute.10 7
The Court cited statutes with First Amendment ramifications as
another distinct aspect of the vagueness doctrine in Grayned v. City
of Rockford.' 8 The Grayned Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance
against vagueness and overbreadth challenges. The ordinance read:
"[N]o person . . . shall willfully make . . . any noise or diversion
which disturbs or tends to disturb [class in session].' 0 9 The Court
held that the vagueness of the terms "noise" and "diversion" was
dispelled by the statute's three requirements: "(1) the 'noise or diver-
sion' [must] be actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2)
there [must] be a demonstrated causality between the disruption that
occurs and the 'noise or diversion'; and (3) the acts [must] be 'will-
fully' done. '"'
103. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975).
104. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942). Since the New
Hampshire courts had consistently construed the statute to apply only to "fighting words," the
Court upheld the proscription of "offensive, derisive, or annoying" comments. Id.
105. Recent Cases, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1397, 1401 n.42 (1990) (discussing Doe v.
Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989)). See infra note 124 for examples of
unprotected speech categories.
106. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). For example, vagueness cases dealing
with purely economic regulation impose less stringent requirements. E.g., United States v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
107. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 28, § 16.9, at 847. "The threat of sanctions may deter
[the exercise of First Amendment freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
108. 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
109. Id. at 107-08. The statute states:
No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in
which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in
the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of such school session or class thereof.
Id.
110. Id. at 113-14.
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The Grayned Court also recognized that in assessing the regu-
lation's reasonableness, the fact that communication is involved must
be heavily weighed; therefore the regulation itself must be narrowly
tailored to a legitimate state interest. " ' The Court concluded that
the regulation in that case did not unnecessarily interfere with First
Amendment rights because the regulation was "narrowly tailored to
further Rockford's compelling interest in having an undisrupted
school session conducive to the students' learning."' 2 Yet the Court
added that the ordinance was reasonable because it "gives no license
to punish anyone because of what he is saying.""'
The first case to address the constitutionality of a university
harassment speech restriction is Doe v. University of Michigan."4
The court applied both the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to a
campus ordinance, providing insight as to how the doctrines would
apply to other hate speech restrictions.
D. Doe v. University of Michigan
In response to several incidents of racism and racial harass-
ment," 5 the University of Michigan adopted a policy which prohib-
ited individuals, under the penalty of sanctions, from "stigmatiz[ing]
or victimiz[ing] an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status.""' 6 A psychology
graduate student, under the pseudonym John Doe, challenged the
University policy as vague and overbroad." 7 He sought to enjoin
enforcement because he feared that classroom discussion in biopsy-
chology"' would be impermissibly chilled." 9
Doe based his concern on an interpretive guide issued by the
University Office of Affirmative Action, which suggested that Michi-
gan students could be sanctioned for such actions as laughing at a
Ill. Id. at 116-17.
112. Id. at 119.
113. Id. at 120.
114. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
115. One incident cited was an anonymous distribution of a flier declaring "open sea-
son" on blacks, referred to as "saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos." Id. at 854.
116. Id. at 856.
117. Id. at 861.
118. Biopsychology is described as "the interdisciplinary study of the biological bases of
individual differences in personality traits and mental abilities." Id. at 858.
119. Doe claimed that certain controversial theories postulating biologically based differ-
ences between sexes and races might be perceived as "sexist" and "racist," making discussion
of such theories sanctionable. Id.
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joke about a classmate who stutters, telling "jokes about gay men
and lesbians," commenting "in a derogatory way about a particular
person or group's physical appearance or sexual orientation," or re-
marking in class that "women just aren't as good in this field as
men. '" '12 One Michigan student had already been subjected to a for-
mal disciplinary hearing for having said in a social work research
class that he believed homosexuality was a psychologically treatable
disease. 2 Although the University withdrew the guide at the time of
the suit, and Doe had not been subject to enforcement of the policy,
the court declared that Doe had standing because "there existed a
realistic and credible threat that Doe could be sanctioned were he to
discuss certain biopsychological theories." '22
The court outlined the types of behavior that may be subject to
state regulation. Conduct may be regulated by the state, 2 ' but "pure
speech" cannot be regulated unless the speech falls into an unpro-
tected category. 24 In particular, the court stated that under specific
instances, racial and ethnic epithets, slurs, and insults may be "fight-
ing words" and could constitutionally be prohibited by the Univer-
sity.' 25 "Nevertheless, [the court] failed to explore whether the
[U]niversity's policy could be interpreted as forbidding only fighting
words, perhaps because Supreme Court cases have left that area vir-
tually empty."' 26 The court found that the University could not pro-
scribe speech that it disagreed with or even found offensive. 12 7 It
then emphasized the special significance of these speech principles in
the academic arena, "where the free and unfettered interplay of com-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 861.
122. Id. at 859-60.
123. Id. at 861-62; see TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-7, at 599. But see Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that flag-burning is constitutionally protected as a form of
"symbolic speech").
124. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Examples of wholly unprotected categories include: "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); child
pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); incitement to imminent unlawful
action, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); libelous statements of no public interest,
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see also discussion
in TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-18, at 929-30. Professor Tribe proposes that the Court is
constructing a "multi-level edifice" of intermediate categories of speech that are only partially
constitutionally protected, such as commercial speech and offensive speech. TRIBE, supra note
33, § 12-18 at 929-30.
125. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 862.
126. Recent Cases, supra note 105, at 1398 n.Il.
127. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863.
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peting views is essential to the institution's educational mission. '"128
The Doe court found the policy overbroad both on its face and
as applied because it reached constitutionally protected speech.129
The policy was facially overbroad because the Supreme Court has
uniformly held that statutes which proscribe speech or conduct solely
because they are offensive are unconstitutionally overbroad. 3 ° Fur-
thermore, the manner of resolution of three complaints regarding
student classroom remarks demonstrated that the policy had been in-
terpreted to reach protected conduct. " '
As applied, the policy was overbroad because the threat of being
brought before a hearing panel would chill academic discourse.
13 2
For example, the University Administrator attempted to persuade an
accused student to accept voluntary sanctions. However, a subtle
threat existed that failure to accept sanctions would result in a for-
mal hearing."
Finally, the court struck down the policy as unconstitutionally
vague."3 The court stated that " 'stigmatize' [and] 'victimize' . . .
elude precise definition."'35 Furthermore, the policy was unclear as
to "what kind of conduct would constitute a 'threat' to [or interfer-
ence with] an individual's academic efforts."' 3 6 The court found that
"[s]tudents of common understanding were necessarily forced to
guess at whether a comment about a controversial issue would later
be found . . . sanctionable under the Policy."'"" Enforcement of the
vague policy would constitute a due process violation."'
128. Id.
129. Id. at 866.
130. Id. at 864.
131. Id. at 866. One complaint involved a student's statement that homosexuality is a
treatable disease, see supra text accompanying note 121, which resulted in a formal hearing
but no conviction. A second complaint was filed against a student for reading an allegedly
homophobic limerick in class. A third complaint involved an allegedly racist remark. These
complaints were informally resolved with apologies and attendance at a " 'gay rap'session" for
the perpetrator of the allegedly anti-gay remarks. Id. at 865-66.
132. "[TIhe University considered serious comments made in the context of classroom
discussion to be sanctionable under the Policy." Id. at 866.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 866-67.
135. Id. at 867.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 497 (1982) (stating that vague laws violate due process).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The University of California amended its policies applying to
student conduct to prohibit the use of "fighting words" to harass an-
other based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disa-
bility, or other personal characteristics."3 9 This policy espouses the
idea "that words can be used in such a way that they no longer
express an idea, but rather are used to injure and intimidate, thus
undermining the ability of individuals to participate in the university
community. '
Racist speech, in particular, has been the focus of the contro-
versy."" Racial insults have been described as unworthy of First
Amendment protection because "[tlhe perpetrator's intention is not
to discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim."" 2 A
significant underlying assumption behind such campus regulations,
therefore, is that such speech victimizes historically disadvantaged
groups so the adoption of such speech regulations prevents the per-
petuation of discrimination and inequality." 8
Opponents contend that the university is the "marketplace of
ideas,""' and that the fear of punishment under any speech restric-
tion will chill free expression." The Court noted in the flag-burn-
ing decision of Texas v. Johnson"' that "[i]f there is a bedrock prin-
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '""17 As a result, the debate
has been framed in terms of a "tension between the free speech pro-
139. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
140. William A. Rusher, Fighting Words vs. Symbols, 4 CONSERVATIVE CHRON. 26
(1989) (quoting David Gardner, University of California President).
141. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 2; Strossen, supra note 11.
142. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 452.
143. See Matsuda, supra note 12, at 2374-81 (arguing that both substantive and proce-
dural equality must be achieved prior to free speech enforcement); Delgado, supra note 1
(advocating enactment of a tort cause of action for racial insults).
144. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
145. For example, one news article noted: "On the campus that just a generation ago
produced the Free Speech Movement, a sullen reticence has taken hold. Students and faculty
alike have grown hesitant to express unpopular views that might be branded as racist. The
"chilling effect" of the fighting words policy is apparent." Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16; see
also Jerry Adler et al., Thought Police, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48 (discussing the
current "experiment" on college campuses to eliminate prejudice through regulation of "politi-
cally correct" ways to express views on race, sex, and other personal characteristics); Steve
France, Hate Goes to College, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 44 (discussing the debate over hate
speech regulations).
146. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
147. Id. at 414.
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visions of the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantees
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment. "14"
IV. ANALYSIS
An effective analysis of whether the UC Harassment Policy un-
constitutionally restricts protected speech must include a review of
both the language and the application of the policy. "Many factors,
which are heavily fact-oriented, must be considered, including time,
place, pattern of conduct and, where relevant, the existence of an
authority relationship between speaker and target." 14' This is pri-
marily because the "fighting words" doctrine has evolved into a con-
text-based violation."' 0
A. Vagueness and the University of California Harassment Policy
Although the Supreme Court is more tolerant of vagueness in
laws with civil rather than criminal sanctions, 1 ' strict judicial scru-
tiny will be applied to laws which regulate fundamental constitu-
tional rights such as free speech.' 52 The penalties for violation of the
UC Harassment Policy do not include incarceration, but potential
ramifications such as suspension or dismissal, which carry a social
stigma and have serious effects on future educational and employ-
ment opportunities. 53 This regulation can therefore be seen as
quasi-criminal and further supports strict judicial scrutiny for
vagueness.
The two words central to the UC Harassment Policy that could
be subject to vagueness infirmities are "fighting words"' 54 and "har-
148. Bill Blum & Gina Lobaco, Fighting Words at the ACLU, CALIF. LAW., Feb.
1990, at 44.
149. Strossen, supra note 11, at 572 n.442; see also supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
150. TRIBE, supra note 33, §12-18, at 929 & n.9.
151. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,498-
99 (1982).
152. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("[Stricter standards of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech;
a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas
may be the loser."); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("These considera-
tions apply with particular force where the challenged statute acts to inhibit freedoms affirma-
tively protected by the constitution.").
153. E.g., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, BERKELEY CAMPUS REGULATIONS IMPLEMENT-
ING UNIVERSITY POLICIES §§ 430-438 (1985).
154. See infra part IV.B. for discussion of the "fighting words" doctrine as it is applied
in the UC Harassment Policy.
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ass."' 5 A court will analyze both the plain language of the words as
well as the context of the statute's enforcement for potential
vagueness.
The word "harassment," was held unconstitutionally vague in
Dorman v. Satti,"' where the Second Circuit invalidated a statute
that prohibited "harassment" of persons "engaged in the lawful tak-
ing of wildlife," partly due to the susceptibility of "harassment" to
different interpretations."5" The UC Harassment Policy defines
"harassment" as when the utterance of "fighting words" will "inter-
fere with the victim's ability to pursue effectively his or her educa-
tion."' 8 Similarly, the Doe court explained that the University of
Michigan policy sanctioned comments that had the "purpose or rea-
sonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's aca-
demic efforts."'"' However, the court found that the type of conduct
that would interfere with an individual's academic efforts was "ques-
tionable."' ° Hence, the Doe court held that the policy was vague
because the interpretive policy gave inadequate guidance as to what
comments were sanctionable."' "[T]he university never articulated
any principled way to distinguish sanctionable from protected
speech. Students were necessarily forced to guess . . . ."'" Similar to
the University of Michigan policy, the UC Harassment Policy may
be unconstitutionally vague without additional guidance from the
university administration regarding what defines "harassment."
In addition to analyzing the plain language of the words "har-
assment" and "fighting words," the court will also look at the poten-
tial discriminatory enforcement of the law. One commentator has
noted that "[r]egardless of how carefully these rules are drafted, they
inevitably are vague and unavoidably invest officials with substantial
discretion in the enforcement process."' 8
However, a vague statute may be saved if the scope is narrowly
defined, such as limiting regulations to speech categories not consti-
tutionally protected." 4 This is the primary difference between the
University of Michigan policy which was struck down for vagueness
155. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
156. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099 (1989).
157. Id. at 433, 436; see also Strossen, supra note 11, at 527 n.206.
158. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
159. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
160. Id. at 867.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Strossen, supra note 11, at 528.
164. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
1276 [Vol. 32
SPEECH REGULATION
and the UC Harassment Policy. The UC Harassment Policy regu-
lates only "fighting words" while the University of Michigan policy
proscribed a broad, undefined category of speech.
In the First Amendment context, statutes that restrain speech in
vague terms either include protected forms of speech or make a per-
son of common intelligence guess as to whether his speech violates
the statute.' The Grayned holding indicates that regulations in-
volving communication must be strictly scrutinized while the regula-
tion itself must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate state interest.' 66
The objective of campus speech regulations is to achieve an academic
environment conducive to learning, free of racial or violent harass-
ment. This is a compelling state interest, similar to the school dis-
trict's interest in Grayned to have an undisrupted school session con-
ducive to students' learning.' 67 Therefore, the state interest behind
the UC Harassment Policy is sufficient to uphold the policy.
Vague statutes can be saved if the scope of the statute is limited.
Therefore, the vagueness of "fighting words" and "harass" in the
UC Harassment Policy can be saved if the regulation is limited to
forms of unprotected speech. In this case, the regulation is specifi-
cally limited to "fighting words," a recognized exception to constitu-
tionally protected speech.'" The UC Harassment Policy is more
narrowly drafted than the University of Michigan anti-harassment
policy which was struck down for vagueness. The University of
Michigan policy proscribed "any behavior . . . that stigmatizes or
victimizes an individual [which] creates [a] hostile . . . environment
for educational pursuits."' 69 However, the UC Harassment Policy
proscribes a narrow category of speech, "fighting words," "when
their use creates a hostile educational environment.' 1 70 Since the UC
Harassment Policy is solely limited to "fighting words," held as un-
protected speech by the Supreme Court, a vagueness challenge would
fail.
B. Fighting Words Doctrine
Since the UC Harassment Policy relies entirely on proscription
of "fighting words," the regulation also must be analyzed in its ap-
165. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972).
166. Id. at 121.
167. Id. at 110-11.
168. See discussion supra part II.A.
169. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (emphasis
added).
170. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
1992] 1277
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
plication of the "fighting words" doctrine. One commentator has
summarized the current developments of the "fighting words" doc-
trine into four distinct criteria which must all be fulfilled for proper
invocation.' The offending language (1) must constitute a person-
ally abusive epithet, (2) must be addressed in a face-to-face manner,
(3) must be directed to a specific individual and be descriptive of that
individual, and (4) must be uttered under such circumstances that
the words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent re-
sponse by the average recipient.17 1
First, the UC Harassment Policy specifically defines "fighting
words" as "personally abusive epithets."'73 The first element is
therefore met.
Second, the face-to-face requirement, although not specifically
stated in the policy, is met by the phrase: "when directly addressed
to any ordinary person."'' This requirement has been construed by
the judiciary to mean an "extremely close" physical presence.'7 5 For
example, a speaker fifteen feet away and driving by the target has
not satisfied the test.17 6
Third, although the UC Harassment Policy does not state that
the words must be "descriptive" of a specific individual, it proscribes
derogatory references to "personal characteristics.'7 Hence, the UC
Harassment Policy meets the third criteria of the "fighting words"
doctrine because "personal characteristics" implies a description of a
particular individual being addressed.
Finally, the Supreme Court has based the "fighting words" doc-
trine not simply on the content of the speech, but also on the context
in which the speech is uttered. "Fighting words" definitions based
solely on content have been struck down by the Court.1 78 Therefore,
to pass constitutional muster, any statute that proscribes "fighting
words" cannot simply refer to the words themselves, but must indi-
cate that the utterance of the words must be likely to cause an immi-
171. Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 563
(1980). The original "fighting words" doctrine outlined by the United States Supreme Court
combined the face-to-face and individual encounter as one element. See supra notes 29-32 and
accompanying text.
172. Gard, supra note 171, at 563.
173. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
174. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
175. Strossen, supra note 11, at 525.
176. Strossen, supra note 11, at 525 & n.201.
177. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4.
178. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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nent breach of the peace. 179 The UC Harassment Policy stipulates
that "fighting words" are "in the context used and as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction
whether or not they actually do so.' 8 The UC Harassment Policy
thus passes the fourth and final element of the "fighting words"
doctrine.
In sum, the UC Harassment Policy explicitly fulfills all of the
elements of the "fighting words" doctrine as delineated by the Su-
preme Court.
C. Overbreadth
Any speech regulation will be found overbroad, and therefore
void, if it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech in addi-
tion to the proscribed unprotected speech.181 The regulation must be
analyzed both on its face and as applied. For example, the Doe court
found the University of Michigan code overbroad, not necessarily
based on its language but on its enforcement record. 82 "The manner
in which ...complaints were handled demonstrated that the Uni-
versity considered serious comments made in the context of classroom
discussion to be sanctionable under the Policy." '83
The UC Harassment Policy speech regulation is susceptible to
invalidity if it chills speech beyond "fighting words." However,
"there is a real danger that even a narrowly crafted [hate speech]
rule will deter some expression that should be protected."'' 84 It is
inevitable that students may be concerned that a hate speech rule
will be used to suppress unpopular views, so that students will re-
frain from expressing controversial viewpoints. The climate on col-
lege campuses has resulted in usage of terminology and discussion of
ideas that are only "politically correct."' 85 Hence,"anti-harassment
rules conceived primarily to protect racial minorities from hateful
epithets tend to get extended to a far wider range of speech ... these
rules cast a shadow over much speech that ought to enjoy First
Amendment protection. '"18"
179. Strossen, supra note 11 at 525; Gard, supra note 171, at 536.
180. UC Harassment Policy, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
181. See overbreadth discussion supra part II.B.
182. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
183. Id. at 866; see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
184. Strossen, supra note 11, at 529.
185. Adler et al., supra note 145, at 48-49.
186. Stuart Taylor Jr., Fending off Fighting Words, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1990, at
19.
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Although the UC Harassment Policy fulfills all the legal pa-
rameters for the definition of "fighting words,"' 187 a student is still
left with generalizations such as "a matter of common knowledge...
inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction." '188 The UC Harass-
ment Policy could still be invalidated as overbroad on its face if it
prevents students from exercising their right to freedom of expres-
sion. The UC Harassment Policy should be narrowly drawn to not
have any such susceptibility.
In the present form, the UC Harassment Policy is not drafted
narrowly enough to withstand an overbreadth challenge. Since a stu-
dent will be careful not to approach the "fighting words" line, the
natural repercussion is chilling speech and suppressing a fundamen-
tal right under the First Amendment. It is difficult to ascertain when
a comment on an individual's characteristic is a mere expression and
when it crosses the line and becomes a "fighting word." Although
the UC Harassment Policy definition for "fighting words" has met
all of the constitutional requirements for "fighting words," the cate-
gory still could keep students from expressing unpopular views to
avoid the risk of being subject to sanctions such as dismissal. Since
such expression is often in a grey area, only those willing to risk
sanctions would be willing to test the bounds of this speech regula-
tion. As a result, the UC Harassment Policy is overbroad on its face
and does not pass constitutional muster because its application could
reach both protected and unprotected speech.
V. PROPOSAL
The controversy continues in the legal and academic communi-
ties as to the most effective type of anti-harassment standards, or
even whether any such regulations should be enacted. All have
agreed, though, that the increase of racial intolerance on college cam-
puses must be addressed. The University of California decided on a
"fighting words" policy. Other campuses, in addition to utilizing
"fighting words" formats, have chosen alternative formats for anti-
harassment policies.' 89 Two popular formats include policies
modeled after the intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine
and environmental impact standards.
187. See supra part IV.B.
188. UC Harassment Policy, supra, note 4.
189. See infra note 193.
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A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
One anti-harassment policy format is modeled after the tort for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.19 The appeal of this pol-
icy format is that it focuses on the type of harm most commonly
associated with racist speech directed at individuals. 9 The individ-
ual suffers psychological and emotional harm which interferes with
his or her pursuit of an education. "Fighting words" policies address
violent reactions by the addressee, which are less likely to result than
intimidation and emotional hostility.
The key disadvantage to using the pure tort for campus speech
regulation is that it primarily focuses on the victim's reaction. Stan-
ford University, for instance, decided against using this tort for its
anti-harassment policy: "We think it better in defining a disciplinary
offense to focus on the prohibited conduct; we prefer not to require
the victims of personal vilification to display their psychic scars in
order to establish that an offense has been committed.
1 92
B. Environmental Impact Standards
Other schools have adopted formats for anti-harassment policies
that focus on the effect on the learning environment for groups and
individuals.' 93 Advocates of this format believe that it is most consis-
tent with the objectives of achieving an academic environment
equally accessible to all individuals.' 94 However, environmental poli-
cies that are too broad are inconsistently applied as administrations
change. Broad environmental policies also risk failing the constitu-
tional tests for vagueness or overbreadth.
For example, the University of Michigan policy found void in
Doe was a broad environmental policy. The Doe court examined the
requirement that "victimizing" language had to affect an individual
in one of three ways. It had to either threaten an individual's aca-
demic efforts, interfere with such efforts, or create an intimidating
190. Strossen, supra note 11, at 514-17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965) states that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress."
191. Strossen, supra note 11, at 515. See generally Matsuda, supra note 12.
192. Strossen, supra note 11, at 516 n.157.
193. Dean Gerald Uelmen, When Freedom Harms: The Conflict Between the Freedom
of Expression and the Banning of Harassment, Address at Santa Clara University (Nov. 8,
1990) (tape and transcript available in Santa Clara University Orradre Library, Center for
Applied Ethics) (categorizing campus anti-harassment policies into three types: (1) broad, un-
defined standards, (2) "fighting words" policies, and (3) environmental impact standards).
194. Id.
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environment for academic pursuits.' 95 The court found these clauses
made the statute vague because "it was simply impossible to discern
any limitation on [the statute's] scope or any conceptual distinction
between protected and unprotected conduct."' 96
C. Revising the UC Harassment Policy
Although the intentional infliction of emotional distress and en-
vironmental impact formats have specific advantages, such benefits
are outweighed by their weaknesses. Therefore, rather than enacting
an entirely new format for the University of California anti-harass-
ment policy, the existing policy should be amended to eliminate the
overbreadth problem and achieve the objectives of an open learning
environment.
The UC Harassment Policy passes the tests for both "fighting
words" and constitutional vagueness; however, a litigant could defeat
the policy on overbreadth grounds.'97 The policy is overbroad be-
cause it chills expression protected by the Constitution. In order to
mitigate the effects of such self-censorship, while protecting all stu-
dents from personal harassment, the UC Harassment Policy should
be amended to focus on the intent and context of the expression
rather than on the content of the expression. Therefore, along with
eliminating the "fighting words" focus, the UC Harassment Policy
should be amended by the following definition of "harassment": Any
action made with the intent of inflicting emotional distress upon an-
other individual will constitute harassment when in the context used,
and as a matter of common knowledge, it is inherently likely to re-
sult in severe emotional distress which interferes with the individ-
ual's academic efforts.198
The primary change is that the UC Harassment Policy should
articulate an intent requirement. Although the anti-harassment pol-
icy is not a criminal statute, the severity of sanctions such as suspen-
sion or dismissal can be considered quasi-criminal in nature because
of their social stigma and impact on an individual's livelihood. The
resultant potential for chilling expression calls for an intent
195. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
196. Id. at 867.
197. See supra parts IV.A-C.
198. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) proposed a similar alternative to the
University of Michigan regulation found void for vagueness in Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852; see
Strossen, supra note 11, at 520 n.177 (Proposed alternative would proscribe "any action di-
rected toward another student ... with the specific intention of inflicting emotional distress ...




This proposal would pass constitutional muster because it elim-
inates the overbreadth problem. Protected speech such as academic
discourse would not be chilled because a speaker must intend to hurt
particular individuals rather than merely add an unpopular or non-
politically correct viewpoint to a classroom discussion.199 Thus,
speech directed at individuals with the intent to hurt those individu-
als would violate the anti-harassment policy, whereas voicing an un-
popular opinion not directed at particular individuals, as in a class-
room setting, would not be sanctionable. The proposed amended
policy also removes the inherent difficulties in a "fighting words"
construction since the UC Harassment Policy's application would no
longer depend on each epithet to fit in the four criteria for proper
invocation of the doctrine.
2 0 0
The intent appropriate for this policy would be the same as that
required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendant either desires to cause the distress or knows that it is
substantially likely to follow from his or her actions °.20 Some cases
have also extended the requirement to include "conduct not intended
to cause mental disturbance, but willful, wanton or reckless in its
deliberate disregard of a known high degree of risk of it.'' ° For
instance, a threatening phone call or face-to-face torment for being
homosexual would fulfill the requisite intent requirement while class
discussions usually would not rise to the required level of specific
intent.
Finally, although an element of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress is the resultant emotional distress itself,'03 the
proposed amended UC Harassment Policy would not necessarily re-
quire proof of emotional distress. Any measurement of emotional dis-
tress would be highly subjective and oftentimes difficult to prove,
which may prevent individuals from reporting incidents. However,
the proposed amendment incorporates the advantage of codes
modeled after the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
199. Both criminal and civil statutes, for example, have been saved from constitutional
attack with the inclusion of an intent requirement. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
395 (1979); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 585 (1974) (White, J., concurring); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1945).
200. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
201. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
12, at 64 (5th ed. 1984).
202. Id. at 65.
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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because it focuses on the harm to the victim, rather than on the con-
tent of the language uttered. In order to prevent unfounded charges
of racism or sexism, the proposed amended UC Harassment Policy
requires only that emotional distress must, as a matter of common
knowledge, be inherently likely to result from the speaker's
expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
The UC Harassment Policy is a speech restriction based on the
"fighting words" exception to the First Amendment. This comment
set forth the current judicial treatment of the "fighting words" doc-
trine. Since the Supreme Court has often used the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines to invalidate "fighting words" statutes, the
comment also analyzed these two constitutional doctrines. The com-
ment discussed the application of the vagueness and overbreadth doc-
trines in Doe v. University of Michigan."4 The comment then ap-
plied the tests for "fighting words," overbreadth and vagueness to the
UC Harassment Policy. Finally, the comment proposed an amend-
ment to the UC Harassment Policy to protect students from personal
harassment while mitigating the effects of censorship.
One commentator questioned, "Is it possible to protect individ-
ual minority students from being harassed with racist epithets and
other personal abuse on campus without getting into censorship of
everything from casual conversations to tasteless T-shirts?" ' 6 The
answer is "yes." Although it is a fine distinction, a campus regula-
tion focusing on intent, context and resultant distress could protect
all students from any type of personal harassment and ensure equal
educational opportunity. Most importantly, though, if narrow rules
proscribing speech are adopted by college campuses, they should be
part of an overall program designed to address biases such as sexism,
homophobia and racism.20 6 Excessive attention to speech content will
204. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
205. Taylor, supra note 186.
206. See Strossen, supra note 11, at 572 (citing the ACLU suggestions for campus pro-
grams to combat various forms of bias in conjunction with regulations.); World News Tonight:
American Agenda, The Question of Speech and Banning of Racist Remarks (ABC television
broadcast, Nov. 1, 1990) (reporting on campus workshops such as those at the University of
Wisconsin designed to increase awareness of stereotypes and prevent the harassment that
speech regulations proscribe); Marilyn Soltis, Sensitivity Training 101, A.B.A. J., July 1990,
at 47 (discussing cultural sensitivity programs offered at the University of Connecticut and
University of San Diego).
1284 [Vol. 32
1992] SPEECH REGULATION 1285
divert our energy from addressing the causes of prejudice to merely
attacking the symptoms.
Rita E. Tautkus

